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INTRODUCTION
The National Guard and Reserves are organized and funded to supplement active forces when needed. 1 In peacetime, however, National Guard units belong to states, and Reserves.
The challenge of maintaining a Total Force requires periodic examination of the statutory scheme that governs the Guard and Reserves. This paper will review the historic background that led to the current law that places the National Guard under control of the states as well as the impact of the National Guard's legal status on the Total Force. The paper will offer three options. The first option is to eliminate the Guard's state status by merging it into the Reserves. The second option is to maintain the status quo, continuing the National Guard's dual status. Finally, the third and recommended option is to keep the dual status of the Guard, but to revise the law to allow the DOD to federalize the Guard more easily.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The philosophical roots of the modern National Guard are found in the European militia tradition. The traditional militia was based on the concept that all able-bodied males were obliged to join together to protect their community from danger. The advantage of a militia was that it was much cheaper than training and maintaining a standing army. Militia members who were not professional soldiers devoted most of their time to other occupations.
English colonists living in frontier American communities did not have the luxury of standing armies and used the militia system for security. Colonial militias were generally adequate to meet the threat posed by hostile Native American tribes, but the militias were much less effective when joined together for participation in prolonged engagements such as the French and Indian War (1756-63). 9 The militias lacked the formal military training and discipline of professional soldiers. Militia members also suffered from prolonged campaigns because they were taken away from the farms and businesses that were their livelihoods.
The militia made significant contributions during the War for Independence.
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After the war, leaders of the new nation debated the wisdom of continuing the militia system or maintaining a standing army. Many influential Americans associated the presence of professional soldiers with the English monarchy. Standing armies were seen as a means of enforcing tyranny and a threat to democratic rule. 11 The concept of using militias-armed citizens with democratic values-to defend the nation had much appeal. 12 On the other hand, many former soldiers, George Washington included, knew the Revolution would not have succeeded if it had relied solely on the Colonial militias.
13
Washington did recognize the value of keeping a federalized militia, and in his "Sentiments on a Military Establishment" submitted to the Congress in 1783, Washington recommended a force structure that included a small standing army and a trained, federally-controlled militia in reserve. 16 Congress made all males from ages 18 to 45 part of the militia, and only gave the federal government access to the force in times of insurrection or invasion. There were no provisions for federal funding, training or oversight, and each militia member was responsible for providing his own arms and equipment.
The weakness of United States' military policy was apparent in the War of 1812. 17 Despite federalizing over 527,000 militia members during the course of the war, a force of 5,000 British soldiers was able to invade the country and burn the capital.
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The militia's performance during the war was inconsistent. Although Andrew Jackson achieved some notable victories, 19 the New York militia, citing the provision in the law limiting the militia to insurrections and invasions, refused to cross the border and fight the British in Canada. 20 The governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut simply refused to implement the President's order to federalize the militia.
21
The militia was not available in the Mexican War because the military mission fell outside the militia's insurrection and invasion mandate. 22 The country did, however, rely on the states to recruit volunteers to augment the regular army. 23 The volunteers did not serve under regular Army officers and were generally led by political appointees. 24 The ad hoc force created by the volunteer system was not the trained reserve envisioned by Washington in 1783.
The militia was federalized by President Lincoln at the beginning of the Civil War. The militia did not, however, play an important part in the outcome of the war because the law limited the use of the militia to a period of three months. 25 President
Lincoln was forced to use the volunteer system and later had to implement the draft. The volunteer system did have attributes common to the militia system. States were tasked with recruiting troops and commissioning officers, but these soldiers were inducted into the federal army, not into the state militia. 26 The actual militia mainly served as a home guard. 27 After the Civil War states began to abandon the concept of relying on a militia composed of all able-bodied males. 28 States formed units made up of select trained men.
The new organizations were called National Guards. 29 There were still no federal standards or funding, and Guard units did not train with the regular Army. The Army did, however, take notice of the rise of the National Guard during the 1870's and began discussing using uniform training standards to make the National Guard a viable reserve force. 30 In the 1880's Guard members also began lobbying for federal funding and for a role as reserve force. 31 The impetus for change in the militia laws came in the Spanish American War.
Guard units served in Cuba and the Philippines, but only through a statute permitting militia members to voluntarily abandon their militia status and join the federal army.
32
Involuntary activation was out of the question since this war again failed to meet the statutory prerequisite of insurrection or invasion. 33 The mobilization process for the Spanish American War was conducted by the states. National Guard units were activated by state governors, assembled and asked to volunteer for federal service. 34 The states were also tasked with calling for volunteers from the population at large using Civil War methods. The process was orderly in some states, but in others it became a political free for all with ambitious office seekers lobbying governors for choice commissions.
35
Following the Spanish American War, Congress initiated a series of military reforms under the guidance of Secretary of War Elihu Root. 36 The Dick Act, passed in 1903, retained the militia composed of all able-bodied males, but divided the militia into a Reserve Militia and an Organized Militia. 37 The Organized Militia was composed of federally-funded state organizations that could be activated for up to nine months to quell insurrections, repel invasions, and enforce federal law. 38 The Organized Militia was required to structure itself along regular Army lines. 39 To receive federal funds and equipment, the Organized Militia was required to train at fixed intervals. 40 Drills and annual training were mandatory, and the Organized Militia was required to follow regular Army-imposed standards. 41 In 1908, Congress took additional steps to move away from the volunteer system.
With encouragement from members of the National Guard, Congress passed legislation requiring the Organized Militia to be activated before a call went out for volunteers. 42 The 1908 Act also removed the nine-month limitation on militia service and allowed the Organized Militia to be used outside the United States. 43 The ability to use the Organized Militia outside the United States was not completely resolved by the 1908 statute. In 1912 the U.S. Attorney General, concurring with the Judge Advocate General of the Army, issued an opinion stating that it was unconstitutional for the Organized Militia to operate outside of the country. 44 The Attorney General's opinion encouraged discussions regarding the efficacy of abandoning the militia and installing an Army reserve force in its place. 45 The National Defense Act of 1916 reorganized the military, federalized the Organized Militia (now called the National Guard), and created the Reserves. 46 The Act restricted the ability of states to maintain troops other than the National Guard, and required Guard members to attend more drills than the 1903 legislation specified. 47 The National Defense Act, however, provided federal funds to pay members to attend drills.
48
The Act also gave the Army authority to set minimum qualifications for officers and to federally recognize or reject officers appointed by governors. 49 National Guard members were now required to take two oaths on joining, one to the state and one to the federal government.
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The National Guard was federalized in World War I and sent overseas.
Arguments that the militia could not constitutionally serve overseas were rejected by the courts. Looking to the war powers (rather than militia clauses) given to Congress by the Constitution, the courts found drafting individuals into federal service, regardless of National Guard affiliation, to be constitutional.
51
The National Guard experience in World War I was not all positive. National
Guard members were mobilized as individual draftees or volunteers. National Guard members were discharged from state service when they volunteered or were drafted, and after the war most did not choose to renew their affiliation with the Guard. 52 Moreover, since the Guard was mobilized as individuals, Guard units were broken up and members were reassigned. 53 Legislation was enacted in 1920 to correct the deficiencies in the law.
The 1920 Act stated that Guard members were not discharged from their state militia obligations after returning from federal service. 54 The issue of drafting Guard members as individuals was not, however, resolved until the next round of reforms.
Major legal changes in the National Guard were enacted in early 1933 during the first hundred days of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. In 1933 the National Guard of the United States was created and designated a reserve component of the Army. 55 From that point, Guard members truly had dual status-Guard members were part of their state militias and members of a reserve component. Instead of being drafted as individuals, Guard units could now be ordered into federal service by virtue of their status in the Army as a reserve component. 56 Congress declared a national emergency on August 27, 1940 , and the National Guard was activated. 57 With sufficient time to prepare and train, the Guard performed well during the war. Regular Army critics, however, still complained that many Guard officers were old or incompetent and had to be removed before the units could be used in combat.
58
After the war, Secretary Forrestal commissioned a study to make recommendations about the future of the Guard. In 1947 the Gray Board recommended eliminating the militia status of the Guard, making it part of the Reserves. 59 The National
Guard's lobbying arm, the National Guard Association, lobbied Congress and the matter was dropped. Guard and Reserve forces were activated during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. It was apparent that both organizations were suffering from lack of training and equipment.
64
Secretary McNamara studied the problem and determined that it would be more efficient to merge the Reserves into the Guard. 65 The Reserve Officer Association, by now a powerful lobby, intervened, and the idea died in Congress. 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
The seminal case relating to the status of the National Guard under the U.S.
Constitution is Perpich v. Department of Defense. 82 The Perpich case reviews the history of National Guard legislation and concludes that the Guard is a state organization operating pursuant to the Second Militia Clause of the Constitution unless federalized. 
STATUTES GOVERNING THE NATIONAL GUARD
The National Guard is part of the militia, and pursuant to the power given to
Congress by the Second Militia Clause, the Guard is governed by 
IMPACT OF THE GUARD'S DUAL STATUS ON THE TOTAL FORCE
The National Guard is criticized for abuses that are usually attributed to a lack of direct federal oversight. Unlike the Reserves who fall under the formal DOD command structure, state governors are the Commanders in Chief of the National Guard. Unlike the Reserves, Guard members are not subject to the UCMJ. Promotions, although subject to federal oversight, are still primarily a matter of state discretion, and Guard officers are frequently promoted to the general officer ranks without ever having to compete for a promotion on a national level. 116 In a series of articles published in USA Today on 17-19 December 2001, 117 the Guard was criticized for inflating troop-strength numbers that are tied to federal funding. 118 The Guard was also criticized for allowing civil rights abuses and for failing to discipline or eliminate criminals within the officer corps:
Americans have taken comfort since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as National Guard units in nearly every state have been called out to protect airports, power plants and other critical parts of the nation's infrastructure. Yet, at a time when the 460,000-member Guard is playing such a vital role, an investigation by USA TODAY reveals a pattern of misconduct in the Guard's upper echelons that has continued for more than a decade. Much of the misconduct has gone unpunished as governors, state legislatures and members of Congress look the other way and Pentagon investigators are powerless to root out the problems.
The abuses range from inflating troop-strength reports and misusing taxpayer money to sexual harassment and stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in life-insurance payments, some intended for the widows and children of Guardsmen. Together, they raise questions about the quality of some of the Guard's top leaders and the political spoils system under which many are picked.
119
The argument presented by USA Today is that state officials consider the Guard to be part of the active military and therefore rarely intervene in its affairs. 120 The active military, however, has no direct authority over the National Guard until it is federalized, and no effective means to address abuses. Guard officers are, according to USA Today, left to their own devices, and in many cases corruption is the result.
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Writers at USA Today are not the Guard's only critics. In a law review article published in 1990, 122 and again in a 1994 book, Jeffrey A. Jacobs argues that the Guard's state status should be eliminated. 123 "The most radical, most politically controversial, and most necessary step in reforming the system is to eliminate state control of the Army National Guard." 124 Jacobs believes that the concept of a militia as a functional part of the national defense is outdated and contrary to the DOD's Total Force Policy:
Although the Guard's federal mission today bears virtually no resemblance to the role of the colonial militia, the infrastructure within which the Guard must perform that mission is basically the same as that of the militia. Peacetime state control of the National Guard remains. This system is the legacy of a citizen-soldier force designed for a different time, a different place, and a different mission. It is wholly unsuited to the United States Army of the twenty-first century.
The increased funding with which the Guard has been blessed by the Total Force Policy cannot alone buy the Guard's readiness. Notwithstanding the money, peacetime state control of a significant portion of the Army and well over half of its reserve forces impairs the ability of the Army to prepare those forces for combat. State control of the Guard guarantees that training for combat during peacetime will not always be the number one priority, and that when it is, training will not always be accomplished to the standards of the active component, which, in the end, bears the ultimate responsibility for employing the Guard in combat. 125 Jacobs believes that eliminating the Guard would result in a more effective and efficient command structure and save money.
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There is, of course, a positive side of the dual status of the National Guard. The
Guard's state status allows it to be used in ways that Title 10 forces cannot. The Guard, as a state organization, is available to governors for disaster relief and to assist law enforcement agencies faced with riots or civil disturbances. The Guard in its militia status is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act's (18 USC § 1385) prohibition of using the Air Force or the Army for routine law enforcement purposes. 127 The Guard is also currently used in federally-funded interdiction and counterdrug programs nationwide. Congress also listens to the Guard and provides for its needs. If the Guard is eliminated, the funds currently allocated to Guard programs may not be reassigned to the DOD.
Without the Guard, assets that the DOD counts on in a crisis may dwindle and disappear. Making the Guard part of the Reserves could appear to be a public acknowledgment of the obvious. The National Guard's existence is dependent on federal funding, and federal funding is conditioned on the Guard's role as a reserve component.
Providing state governors with a force to call on in times of crisis is certainly an important factor in Congress' continued funding of the Guard, but the state missions of the Guard are secondary to the Guard's contribution towards the national defense. It is hard to argue credibly that Congress agreed to buy advanced jet fighters for the National Guard because they are needed for disaster relief or riot control.
Eliminating the National Guard would not have to be accomplished in one legislative session that eliminated thousands of jobs across the United States. State status could be removed incrementally, with units remaining at their current locations and strengths during a transition period. The National Guard might even function for a time as a separate Title 10 reserve component directed by the National Guard Bureau.
Congress could pass legislation that would allow state governors to obtain help from the newly federalized National Guard in emergency situations. A proposal for gradual change is more likely to survive political scrutiny than a drastic reorganization.
Retain the Status Quo.
The National Guard could be left in its current dual status. There does not appear to be any real evidence that making the Guard into a Title 10 organization would Eliminating the dual status of the National Guard at this juncture does not appear to be warranted. If, however, it is ever determined that the effectiveness of the National Guard has fallen significantly below that of the Reserves, the issue should be revisited.
The current dual status does have its drawbacks and could be improved with a few changes to the present law. First, the provision requiring a governor's consent to voluntary activation should be repealed. 135 The consent provision was added to the 1952 law so that governors could maintain a force level sufficient to meet state needs in the event of disaster. 136 The gubernatorial consent provision is not mandated by the Constitution, 137 and is an artificial requirement-particularly in cases of air crews who routinely fly federal missions in volunteer status. Many units are probably ignoring the consent provision already, and it could be eliminated, at least with respect to air crews, without a fight.
The law should be amended to allow Guard units to be activated during drill
periods. The Perpich decision shows that Congress' authority to activate the National Guard as a reserve component is very broad. Giving the DOD access to Guard assets during drill periods may prove beneficial when forces are allocated to homeland defense and might also provide some additional access to National Guard air crews currently flying routine Title 10 missions on a voluntary basis.
Full time Guard members (AGR and Technician) should be subject to involuntary activation by service secretaries at any time, with some reasonable time limit such as 90
days. Having full time cadre members on active duty would provide continuity when moving traditional Guard members in and out of federal service.
Jacobs suggests abolishing weekend drills for a system of two 15-day periods of active duty a year. 138 This system may work well for members of professions that do not follow a traditional work schedules. Airline pilots, in particular, may prefer concentrating their National Guard duties within two lengthier periods. Guard members in other professions may find it difficult to increase time away from work to 30 days, instead of the current 15 days each year. Jacobs' plan could be implemented on a unit-tounit or on an individual basis. The law should be amended to allow Guard members to serve in two 15-day increments and to be federalized during those periods as needed.
CONCLUSION
The dual status of the National Guard is based on the Militia Clauses of the Constitution. After neglecting the militia for a century, Congress began a series of reforms in 1903 that led to the current system. The National Guard is federally funded and follows standards set by the active component. Guard members, however, serve as state employees until ordered into active service by federal authorities. Once ordered into federal service, unity of command with the active component is possible, and it has become increasingly easy to activate the Guard to support the active component.
There are disadvantages to maintaining a system that removes the peacetime Guard from direct DOD control. Notable cases of cronyism and corruption have occurred because unethical Guard officers have taken advantage of their dual status.
Eliminating the Guard might solve the corruption problem and would permit cost-saving measures. The dual status of the Guard does, however, benefit the nation in some respects. The Guard's Title 32 status provides a federally funded emergency force to the states and provides assistance to law enforcement officials fighting illegal drugs and terrorism. The National Guard's political support also gives the DOD assets it can federalize and use to augment the regular component that it might otherwise not have.
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The DOD can usually find Congressional support for purchasing new equipment if the new equipment is divided among state National Guard units.
Until it is established that the Reserves, who are always subject to DOD control, are a substantially better fighting force, the Guard's dual status should be continued.
Amending the law to allow the active component greater access to the Guard does, however, make good sense. Guard members should be allowed to volunteer for federal service without the administrative hurdle of their governor's consent. The DOD should be able to activate Guard units serving in their weekend drill status. Weekend drills should be eliminated for some Guard members, and the active component should be allowed to federalize Guard members serving in the optional two 15-day periods.
Finally, full time Guard members should be available for federal service at any time for up to 90 days.
Notes
1 The purpose of the reserve component is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other time as the national security may require." 10 USC § 10102. "In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all time." 32 USC § 102.
2 In time of war or national emergency Guard and Reserve units may be activated for the duration of the war or emergency and six months thereafter. 10 USC § 12301(a). The President has the discretion to augment regular forces by activation of up to 200,000 Guard or Reserve unit members for up to 270 days. 10 USC §12304.
3 10 USC § 12301 (b) and (d 10 Ibid., 7. "For all its failings, however, the militia played a crucial role in the Revolution. First and foremost, patriot militia ensured that rebellious Americans gained control of local and state governments early in the war. The British failed to devise a counterrevolutionary strategy that would have allowed them to restore the Crown's authority in even one colony. Local patriot control ensured use of the militia system to mobilize troops. The states managed to provide enough soldiers to sustain the Continental army, organize their own forces, and turn out temporary militia units. Patriot control of the state militia systems gave the Americans the only institutional means available for mobilization." 11 Ibid., 5. "The retention of ten thousand British troops in North America following the defeat of the French in 1763 and Parliament's decision to regulate and tax the colonies, of course, precipitated the political conflict leading to the American Revolution. In identifying the British army as the symbol of imperial oppression, colonial agitators appropriated the anti-standing-army rhetoric of seventeenth-century English Radical Whig thinkers. American opponents of Crown policy found radical ideas appealing because they emphasized that only citizen soldiers, that is, the militia, were fit to defend a republic. Whig ideology maintained that an aroused citizenry organized in an effective militia could save republicanism by restoring constitutional balance, protecting property rights, and preserving civil liberty. Virtuous citizen soldiers would rise in righteous anger to remove the king's armed mercenaries and reassert republican rule." The Second Amendment to the Constitution represents American Radical Whig thinking. The Second Amendment states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 12 Gladman, 41 :"The total capability of the Air Force has, however, occasionally benefited from the strong collective support enjoyed by the reserve components in Congress. Cuts in active programs, for structure, or equipment have often been restored by transferring the items to one of the reserve components."
